Short Interest & Thesis

Short Interest & Thesis

Figures converted from AUD at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, multiples, share counts, and dates are unitless and unchanged.

DMP is one of the most heavily shorted names on the ASX — official ASIC reported short positions sit at roughly 15–16% of issued capital, putting the stock in the top three of more than 700 listed companies for six months running. Short interest has tripled in less than a year (≈5.5% in July 2025 to a peak of ≈17.9% in December 2025) and has stayed elevated as the bear thesis around international execution and a CEO transition has crystallised. There is no full-blown activist short report, but two live shareholder class actions and an analyst-articulated bear case give the crowded short side coherent reasons not to cover.

Bottom-line positioning snapshot

Source class: Official reported short positions — Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) Daily Short Position Report, T+4 settlement basis, retrieved via StockTrack 4 May 2026. ASIC publishes aggregate short positions only — holder identities are not disclosed.

How short interest evolved over the past year

The position climbed from a low-single-digit base in mid-2025 to a peak of ≈17.9% by mid-December 2025, coinciding with weakening German/Dutch SSSG commentary and the Don Meij CEO departure announcement. After easing modestly through 2026 it remains near 15.9% — high enough to keep DMP in the ASX top three despite shares already off ≈80% from their COVID peak.

Rank moved from outside the top 25 in July 2025 to consistently inside the top 3 by Q4 2025, briefly reaching #1 most-shorted on the ASX in February 2026 (per MT Newswires, 3 March 2026, citing ASIC data as of 25 February).

Crowding versus liquidity

ADV of ≈496k shares (≈$5.7m of daily value at $12.02) is modest for a name with ≈$1.29bn market cap. A short book of ≈15m shares is the equivalent of roughly six months of realistic institutional cover pace. Median daily range of ≈3.8% over 60 days compounds the risk: any squeeze or de-risking move travels quickly through a thin order book.

Liquidity input	Value
Shares on issue (StockTrack, 4 May 2026)	94,746,866
20-day average daily volume (shares)	495,946
20-day average daily turnover	$5.68m
60-day median daily range	3.79%
Market cap (latest)	$1.29bn
Enterprise value (latest)	$2.22bn

Sources: ASIC short-position file via StockTrack; staged liquidity data (data/tech/liquidity.json); company.json.

Peer context — the top of the ASX short table

DMP is the only consumer-cyclical name in the ASX short top three; the other two are healthcare names whose short interest has different drivers (FDA risk, convertible-arb hedging, valuation). Source: Motley Fool Australia top-10 most-shorted list dated 4 May 2026, cross-checked against ASIC weekly aggregate. Closest restaurant peer Guzman y Gomez (GYG) was also flagged in the top-20 most-shorted list by Morningstar (30 March 2026 article) but is no longer in the top 10.

The articulated short thesis — what bears actually point to

There is no published short-seller report (no Hindenburg, Viceroy, Blue Orca, or J Capital filing on DMP). The bear thesis is built from public sell-side and broker commentary plus two live legal proceedings.

Source class for items 1–2, 5: price/volume signals + generic market commentary (Morningstar, Reuters, Motley Fool, MarketScreener). Items 3–4: short-seller-style allegations via plaintiff filings (Echo Law class-action notice; Bender v Domino's Pizza Inc., ED Mich.). Treat each layer separately — they reinforce each other but no single item alone is the canonical short report on DMP.

Borrow pressure — evidence is thin

Australia does not have a public, free, daily borrow-rate feed for ASX-listed equities. The fact that a 15%+ short book has been sustained for two full quarters without rolling forced cover indicates that lendable supply has not been a binding constraint, but this is an inference, not a measurement. Do not over-interpret the absence of headline borrow stress as evidence of cheap borrow.

Public net-short disclosures — not applicable

Australia is not a UK/EU-style threshold-disclosure regime. ASIC publishes only the aggregate short position per security (T+4) — individual holder identities of short positions are not publicly disclosed. There is therefore no published list of named hedge-fund shorts in DMP comparable to an FCA short-seller register. Anyone claiming knowledge of specific named shorts is working from broker prime-services colour, not regulatory disclosure.

Short-sale volume context — keep separate

No daily short-sale volume rows were staged for this run, and short-sale flow data should not be conflated with the reported short interest above. The conclusions above are anchored on the ASIC reported-position file (an outstanding short position measurement), not on daily trading flow marked short.

Market setup and squeeze interpretation

Through each of the past three negative catalysts, the short book has expanded or held — i.e., bears have not been forced out and bulls have not pressed the squeeze. That positioning equilibrium changes meaningfully if (i) Andrew Gregory delivers a credible 100-day plan with measurable SSSG inflection at the FY26 result, (ii) the Echo Law class action is dismissed or settled cheaply, or (iii) an unexpected guidance upgrade prints. In all three cases, the combination of high % short, days-to-cover near six months at institutional pace, and a thin tape implies asymmetric upside on any covering wave.

Evidence quality and limitations

The decision-useful picture rests on ASIC reported positions plus an articulated bear thesis with two open class actions. Borrow cost and holder identity are not knowable from public data; both are unavailable rather than missing-and-bad.

So what changes the investment case

• Sizing. A standard-size long should be sized assuming ≈3-month exit at 20% ADV; a high-conviction long should plan for the asymmetric upside if positioning unwinds. Days-to-cover north of 150 trading sessions at institutional pace is genuine crowding, not a slogan.
• Risk control. Earnings prints and class-action procedural milestones are higher-volatility events than they would be in a name with single-digit short. Position sizing through results and around expected court dates is warranted.
• Catalyst interpretation. Any positive surprise — store-growth re-acceleration, dismissal or favourable settlement of either class action, or Europe outperforming the 60% store-growth-runway thesis — will be amplified by short covering on a thin tape. Conversely, another SSSG miss will see short interest tested toward the 18% level last seen in December 2025.
• What would change the verdict. A return of reported short interest below 8% (i.e., the level seen as recently as mid-2025) would materially de-risk the positioning overlay. A formal short-seller report being published would force a re-rating of the thesis-risk component and warrant a fresh review.